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Review without a view 
Will the Kargil report help prevent another Kargil? No 
THE four-member Subrahmanyam Committee began its inquiry into the Kargil episode in July with two broad terms of reference. First 
it Was asked to review the events leading up to the 
Pakistani aggression in Kargil, and second, it was to 
recommend such measures as were considered nec-
essary to safeguard national security against such 
armed intrusions. At the end of the exercise, the 
nation is left fairly clueless on both counts. This is 
not. to say that there are no concrete suggestions 
that have emerged from the four-member commit-
tee's exertions over six months and which included 
some 100 meetings. No less than 25 recommenda-
tions have been put forward, ranging from acquir-
ing equipment like high altitude unmanned aerial 
vehicles, to improving the interface between the 
defence ministry and Army headquarters. 
What is disappointing is that the committee chose 
the soft option of targeting faceless men in various 
intelligence agencies for their various acts of omis-
sion and commission, apart, of course, from heap-
ing blame on die already discredited Brigadier 
Surinder Singh. To state that the Pakistani intru-
sions came as a "complete and total surprise to the 
Indian government, the Army and intelligence 
agencies" is to state the obvious. If the Indian gov-
ernment erred, the nation would have liked a clear-
jr view on the various levels of government that 
had failed it. This reluctance to name names was 
already evident The chairperson of the committee, 
K Subrahmanyam, had gone on record that he and 
his colleagues were more interested in learning 
"what went wrong rather than who". Unfortunate-
ly, often it is the who that directly influences the 
what. The committee is certainly right in express-
ing its dismay at the inability of the Research & 
Analysis Wing (RAW) in identifying enemy 
infantry battalions deployed across the LoC and 
failing to trace the movements of various Northern 
Light Infantry formations. But did the defence min-
istry, on its part, display the necessary awareness 
and response required of it? While the Subrah-
manyam Committee believes that "it is reasonable 
to assume that Nawaz Sharif was at least aware of 
the broad thrust of the Kargil plan when he so 
warmly welcomed the Indian Prime Minister in 
Lahore", it chooses to waffle over the Indian politi-
cal leadership's own lack of alertness. Similarly, 
while opinion may differ on whether the absence of 
Army chief, General V.P. Malik, during the early 
days of the Kargil war proved costly, to flatly state 
that "there was no need to cancel the Army Chiefs 
visit" at that juncture borders on the casual. 
The result is that this much-anticipated report 
demands very little in terms of government reac-
tion. It does not disturb the status quo; it does not 
hold up a mirror in which it can perceive itself, 
warts and all; it does not provoke searching ques-
tions or demand urgent action. Indeed, it is fitting 
then that the government's response to it was 
marked by characteristic bureaucratese: "After due 
consideration of these recommendations, a thor-
ough review, through an appropriate body, of the 
national security system in its entirety, including 
the areas covered by the above recommendations of 
the committee, is being ordered by the govern-
ment." Great. So what does the nation get after a 
war that claimed at least 470 Army personnel and 
which cost Rs 2,000 crore? One committee after 
another which say nothing. 
